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ABSTRACT
Until three years ago, a policy at Delhi Charter School in Lou-
isiana required that any pregnant student be effectively expelled. A
pregnant sixteen-year-old student’s expulsion caught the attention of
national media in 2012. The ACLU sued and the school quickly
rescinded the policy. Although the policy was revoked, the un-adjudi-
cated nature of the resolution leaves teen girls at the school and na-
tionwide without any final court order to protect them against the
(re)enactment of similar discriminatory policies.
This Article analyzes the Delhi Charter School policy in order
to make three related arguments. First, the Court should adopt a
rebuttable presumption of state action when the plaintiff is a charter
school student alleging the deprivation of a fundamental right. Sec-
ond, any pregnancy expulsion policy enforced by a charter school
violates both the Equal Protection doctrine and Title IX. The Equal
Protection claim rests on the remedy left available under Geduldig
v. Aiello, which otherwise crippled women’s access to remedies
against pregnancy discrimination: if a facially neutral policy evi-
dences discrimination, that policy is unconstitutional under the
Equal Protection Clause. Due to the complete lack of rational justi-
fication for these policies, this Article argues that all pregnancy ex-
pulsion policies de facto evidence invidious discrimination. Third,
while Title IX provides another source of remedies, it will not pro-
vide meaningful remedies without reform to its implementation.
This Article concludes with suggested Title IX reforms.
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INTRODUCTION
“Thus the thing began. Had she perceived this meeting’s import she
might have asked why she was doomed to be seen and coveted that
day by the wrong man . . .”
—Thomas Hardy, Tess of the d’Urbervilles.1
One-hundred-forty years after its publication, Thomas Hardy’s tale of
temptation, predation, and ostracism played out for a crowd of practiced
onlookers. This time, Tess was embodied in a sixteen-year-old charter
school student in Delhi, Louisiana, impregnated by a classmate and subse-
quently expelled from the school pursuant to the charter’s policy, while the
father of her child suffered no consequence.
Like Tess, teen girls in American high schools face imminent danger.
Society and school authorities purport that the danger is internal—the un-
controlled sexual proclivities of the girls themselves. On the contrary,
schools and their leaders unwittingly play key roles in orchestrating the
downfalls of teen girls across the country. These institutions deftly bring the
wry and predatory Alec, instigator of Tess’ downfall by way of highly coer-
cive sex, to life through policies and practices designed to punish pregnant
girls for the visible evidence of their surrender to society’s obsessive sexual
predation. Students in charter schools, the wild west of the education sys-
tem, are particularly vulnerable to attack on their constitutional freedoms.
In public schools, it is relatively well established that students have the
right to be free from excessive disciplinary regulation. But in the charter
school system, an educational framework created twenty-four short years
ago, judges have not yet clearly defined the inalienable liberties of students.
Teen girls in charter schools need more definite rights; this would create
more accountability in their charter schools and thereby protect the girls
against the unequal harms showcased in the Delhi Charter School case.
Delhi Charter School in Louisiana required female students suspected
of being pregnant to take pregnancy tests.2 The school reserved the right to
refer the student to a doctor chosen by the school. If the student tested
positive or refused to submit to the test, she was forced to drop out and be
home-schooled.3 Though the school voluntarily rescinded the policy in re-
sponse to a lawsuit by the ACLU, the rights of pregnant teens in charter
schools remain at risk. The Delhi Charter School case highlights a new
1. THOMAS HARDY, TESS OF THE D’URBERVILLES 30 (1965).
2. Janet Mcconnaughey, ACLU Targets Anti-Pregnancy Rule at La. School, USA TODAY
(last updated Aug. 8, 2012, 10:25 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/na-
tion/story/2012-08-07/aclu-anti-pregnancy-louisiana-school/56862780/1.
3. Id.
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frontier in the applications of the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitu-
tion and of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.
The Supreme Court has roughly defined the freedom of expression
that students in public schools possess through its First Amendment juris-
prudence.4 In the charter school system, the barrier between the rights of
students and the powers of administrators and teachers is even less clear.
Delhi Charter School justified its policy as necessary to maintain a school
environment “in which all students will learn and exhibit acceptable charac-
ter traits.”5 However, the passage of Title IX, a federal statute that prohibits
discrimination based on pregnancy status in federally funded schools,6 and
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, an Act that prohibits sex discrimination
on the basis of pregnancy for employment-related purposes,7 firmly estab-
lished the rights of students in publicly-funded schools to be free from dis-
crimination based on pregnancy status.
The state action doctrine limits available remedies for the wrongs
school officials perpetrate against students based on pregnancy status. With-
out a state’s action in a policy discriminating against pregnant students, a
constitutional challenge to the policy (in this case Equal Protection) cannot
be supported. Aside from the hurdle of demonstrating state action, an Equal
Protection claimant must also show the existence of invidious discrimina-
tion in the challenged policy to overcome the standard established in
Geduldig v. Aiello.8 If a student cannot overcome either of these two hurdles,
federal statutory law—specifically Title IX—provides another available rem-
edy. Title IX’s deficient regulatory scheme, however, makes the law a hollow
promise for pregnant students.
This Article discusses the application of the state action doctrine to
charter schools and then considers the likelihood of success for an Equal
Protection Clause or Title IX challenge to a pregnancy expulsion policy. In
Part I, I present a factual landscape of the charter school system. In Part II, I
argue that the Delhi Charter School case shows why the pregnancy expul-
sion policies of charter schools are acts fairly attributable to the state. In
addition, I argue that courts should use a rebuttable presumption of state
action when students allege the deprivation of a fundamental right. In Part
III, I argue that no rational basis exists that could justify the policy under
4. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969);
Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
5. Mcconnaughey, supra note 2.
6. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (a) (Westlaw through P.L. 113–296).
7. See Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (Westlaw through
P.L. 113–296).
8. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
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Equal Protection analysis. I first discuss the effect of Geduldig v. Aiello on
the constitutional analysis of this expulsion policy and then argue that the
remedy left available under Geduldig for invidious discrimination applies in
this case. In Part IV, I briefly discuss the application of Title IX to the Delhi
Charter School policy. In Part V, I summarize suggested remedies for the
current state of relatively unchecked pregnancy discrimination in federally
funded high schools.
I. CHARTER SCHOOLS:WHAT ARE THEY?
Charter schools all share two characteristics: “(1) a charter contract
that establishes their authority to exist and binds them to accountability
standards; and (2) some form of relief from the state statutory and regula-
tory requirements imposed on traditional public schools.”9 Beyond these
two basic characteristics, state legislatures set the definitions and require-
ments of charter schools.10 Since the first charter school was established, the
number of charter schools in America has grown to more than 6,500
schools, serving more than 2.5 million children across the country.11
A. The Purpose of Charter Schools
Charter schools were designed to reform the education system in two
ways. First, charter schools increase the accountability of school officials by
placing control of educational programming in the hands of the same peo-
ple who are responsible for student achievement (the individual school’s
board members).12 In public schools, the leaders of each individual school
are responsible for the academic success of the students, but a centralized
school board structures the educational program.13 Second, charter schools
create competition in the educational system. Parents of economic means
have always had the benefit of school choice. Wealthy families can afford to
move to areas with high-quality public school systems or to enroll their kids
in private schools. Charter schools provide that same school choice to par-
ents of lower economic means. Under the No Child Left Behind Act of
9. Julie F. Mead, Devilish Details: Exploring Features of Charter School Statutes That Blur
the Public/Private Distinction, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 349, 350 (2003).
10. Id.
11. Choice & Charter Schools, THE CENTER FOR EDUC. REFORM, http://www.edreform
.com/issues/choice-charter-schools/facts/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2015).
12. See Catherine LoTempio, It’s Time To Try Something New: Why Old Precedent Does
Not Suit Charter Schools in the Search for State Actor Status, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
435, 437 (2012).
13. Id.
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2001, a charter school cannot charge tuition.14 Only charter schools that
follow federal standards are eligible to receive federal money.15 So, most
charter schools do not charge tuition, instead providing a free education to
students, “the majority of [which] are minority (52 percent), at risk (50
percent), or low-income (54 percent).”16
The existence of charter schools encourages public schools to be more
responsive to their students’ parents. Otherwise, public school parents may
choose to enroll their kids in a nearby charter school.17 By adding this ele-
ment of competition, charter schools raise the educational standards of local
public schools, as well.
B. The Uniqueness of Charter Schools in the Realm of Education
Five characteristics distinguish charter schools from public schools: (1)
founding legislation; (2) charter from (read: contract with) the state; (3)
private control and ownership; (4) public funding; and (5) lighter regula-
tion.18 First, state legislation creates charter schools, state statutes govern
charter schools, and most states define charter schools as “public” in na-
ture.19 Though charter schools might appear to be very similar to public
schools with regard to founding legislation, the actions charter school ad-
ministrators take after the point of legislative creation are not necessarily
attributable to the state.20 Second, charter schools operate within the con-
fines of a contract between private individuals and the state, which is gener-
ally subject to reevaluation every five years.21 The contract sets the basic
obligations of the charter school, which usually relate to filling a perceived
14. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C. § 7221i (Westlaw through P.L.
113–296).
15. Mead, supra note 9, at 367 (“[I]n order for a charter school to be eligible for plan-
ning and implementation grants or participation in the credit enhancement pro-
gram, a charter school must abide by the prohibition on charging tuition.”).
16. Improving American Education with School Choice, THE CENTER FOR EDUC. REFORM
(Dec. 2012), http://www.edreform.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/Improving-
American-Education-With-School-Choice-DEC-2012.pdf.
17. Mead, supra note 9, at 350.
18. See Jason Lance Wren, Charter Schools: Public or Private? An Application of the Four-
teenth Amendment’s State Action Doctrine to These Innovative Schools, 19 REV. LITIG.
135, 160-64 (2000) (laying out elements of charter schools relevant to courts’ “state
actor” analyses).
19. Id. at 160.
20. See id. (“Although legislation creates charter schools, it leaves most decisions to the
private operators of the schools. Simple legislative approval of charter school initia-
tives is not sufficient to establish state action.”).
21. Id. at 139.
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educational void.22 However, beyond the basic obligations stated at each
school’s founding, charter schools act independently of direct state con-
trol.23 Third, the group that establishes the school, usually private individu-
als,24 shapes the educational programming at the school and oversees day-to-
day operations.25 Fourth, charter schools receive public funding,26 including
in some instances federal funding.27 Fifth, charter schools do not answer to
local school boards or school districts; rather, the private individuals who
establish the school also set the school’s policies.28 The Board of Education
has limited power to review a charter school’s performance, and the degree
of power the Board exercises depends on the state. For example, in Louisi-
ana, pursuant to a formal review, the Board can modify the charter and
revoke or refuse to renew the charter.29
C. Delhi Charter School Facts
The Louisiana Department of Education oversaw the creation of the
Delhi Charter School.30 The school receives 98% of its budget from state
and federal funding, $6,218,000 from the State of Louisiana, and $508,000
from the federal government.31 These funds cover $5,869,000 in yearly ex-
penditures.32 A charter school is valid for an initial period of four years; the
Board of Education reviews the charter on the third year, and contingent
upon the results of the review, the charter is reauthorized for a maximum
period of an additional five years. After the initial authorization period, the
22. Id. Though the author studied Texas charter schools specifically and the details of
each charter school system vary state to state, the Texas statute and charter school
system serve as “an adequate model of the charter school legislation throughout the
nation.” Id.
23. Id. at 142.
24. See id. “[P]rivate individuals, such as parents and teachers, have received the largest
number of the charters issued by the state.” Id. at 141.
25. Id. at 142.
26. See id. at 143 (noting that charter schools are “fully supported by the public funds
they receive (including any federal funds)”).
27. Only 8 states are ineligible for federal charter school funding because those states do
not have the necessary prerequisite charter school laws. Office of Innovation and
Improvement, Finding Federal Funding for a New Charter School or for Dissemination
of Best Practices, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/oii/
csp/funding.html (last modified Nov. 20, 2013).
28. See Wren, supra note 18, at 144.
29. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:3992(A)(1) (Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.).
30. 2012 District Charter Application Process, LA. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://www.loui-
sianaschools.net/topics/district_charter_process.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2012).
31. Delhi Charter School School District, STARTCLASS, http://school-districts.startclass
.com/l/5174/Delhi-Charter-School (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).
32. Id.
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charter can be re-extended for three to ten years, pursuant to additional
review.33
The Board of Directors establishes the school’s policies, including the
expulsion policy, “consistent with the goals and objectives of the Delhi
Charter School.”34 The Board of Directors consists of seven to nine individ-
uals. “When possible,” these members are preferred to have teaching, busi-
ness or other professional experience, or be parents of students enrolled in
the school (though those parents cannot make up a majority of the Board).
The majority of Board members must hold a bachelor’s degree from an
accredited college or university.35 The mission of Delhi Charter School,
which it must fulfill per the terms of its contract with the state, is to provide
an education for “at risk” students. In Louisiana, “at risk” students are de-
fined as “those who are experiencing difficulty with learning, school
achievement, progress through graduation from high school, and/or prepa-
ration for employment due to social, emotional, physical, and mental fac-
tors.”36 The school must maintain a student body of at least 50% “at risk”
students.37
II. IS A PREGNANCY EXPULSION POLICY A STATE ACTION?
Given the hybrid structure of charter schools, the boundary between
state acts and non-state acts has been difficult to find. In order to state a
constitutional claim, the student must first show that, per 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, the conduct at issue is “fairly attributable to the State.”38 She must
demonstrate that she was deprived of a right guaranteed under the Consti-
tution and that the deprivation happened under the color of state law.39
The state action doctrine, which emerged from civil rights case law, was
originally created to distinguish private action from state action within the
realm of the Fourteenth Amendment.40 The Supreme Court has held that if
an action satisfies the state action requirement of the Fourteenth Amend-
33. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:3992(A)(1) (Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.).
34. Delhi Charter School Policy Manual, DELHI CHARTER SCHOOL § A(A03) 2 (Mar. 15,
2015), http://www.delhicharterschool.org/ (follow “DCS Policy manual” link).
35. Id. § A(A03) 1.
36. Evolution of the Concept ‘At Risk’, THE SOUTHWEST EDUC. DEV. LABORATORY,
http://www.sedl.org/rural/atrisk/concept.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2015).
37. Delhi Charter School Policy Manual, supra note 34, § A(A01) 3.
38. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).
39. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49–50 (1999).
40. Wren, supra note 18, at 152.
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ment, it also satisfies the “color of state law” test for Section 1983
purposes.41
A. The Law on State Action
Courts have used five tests to determine whether an action is fairly
attributable to the state: “(1) the symbiotic relationship test; (2) the close
nexus test; (3) the joint action test; (4) the public function test; and (5) the
pervasive entwinement test.”42 Because a private party might engage in state
action with regard to certain actions but not others, courts do not make
categorical judgments.43 Instead, when applying any of these tests to a par-
ticular action, the court examines the conduct itself to determine whether it
constitutes state action.44 Of the five state action tests, the first three are not
applicable to the Delhi Charter School policy. The last two tests are poten-
tially applicable and thus deserve more attention.
The symbiotic relationship test, though never overruled, has fallen out
of favor with the Supreme Court.45 Under that test, the Court considers the
level of interdependence between the state and the private actor.46 When
applying the close nexus test, the court will find state action if the state has
coerced or significantly encouraged the specific action.47 The Court will
find state action under the joint action test when private parties act jointly
with state officials.48 The state and the private party must have conspired to
violate the constitutional rights of the plaintiff.49
The public function and pervasive entwinement tests are more rele-
vant to the charter school context. Under the public function test, courts
have found state action where the state has delegated one of its historic and
traditional functions to a private institution and that delegated function is
within the exclusive control of the state.50 For example, the Court in
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn applied the public function test to find that the dis-
41. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 296 n.2
(2001).
42. LoTempio, supra note 12, at 441.
43. See id. at 442.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 443.
46. Id. at 443. In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961), the Su-
preme Court established the symbiotic relationship test in its holding that, by leasing
part of its lot to a privately owned restaurant, the state municipal parking garage had
placed itself in an interdependent relationship with that restaurant. Id.
47. Id. at 444.
48. LoTempio, supra note 12, at 444 (citing MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983
LITIGATION: CLAIMS AND DEFENSES § 5.16 (2011)).
49. LoTempio, supra note 12, at 444.
50. Id. at 442.
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charge of teachers and a school counselor by a nonprofit, private school for
maladjusted high school students was not state action.51 Three of the
Court’s holdings in Rendell-Baker are of particular significance here. First,
the Court noted that the state actor determination is not made entirely on
the basis of receipt of state or federal funds, as 90% of the school’s budget
in Rendell-Baker came from public funds.52 Second, the Court noted that
the determination is not made based on the extent of state regulation of the
private actor either; despite otherwise extensive state regulation, decisions
related to personnel matters (such as discharge) remained with the school in
Rendell-Baker.53 Third, the Court also noted that the education of malad-
justed students was not within the “exclusive province of the State.”54 This
language has led to some confusion among the courts applying the public
function test to charter schools, as was indicated by the First Circuit’s
broadening of this statement.55 In applying the public function test, the
First Circuit held that public education generally was not the exclusive func-
tion of the state and cited Rendell-Baker for this proposition.56 However, a
more thorough analysis of the Rendell-Baker holding indicates that the
Court constrained the language of its exclusivity limitation to schools spe-
cifically for maladjusted students.57 The Court did not intend for the limi-
tation to be used in applying the public function test to all education
providers.
If the Court were to interpret the exclusivity requirement to apply to
education providers generally, the rationale of the public function test
would be defeated. Using the public function test to analyze delegations of
power prevents the state from delegating actions to private actors for the
purpose of avoiding liability for those actions under the state action doc-
trine.58 Charter schools are created when states assign private actors the re-
sponsibility to provide public education.59 The contract between the state
and the charter school provides the basis for the charter’s existence, and if
the provision of public education is per se beyond the exclusive control of
the state, charter schools could never be held liable as state actors under this
test.
51. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982).
52. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 840.
53. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 841.
54. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 842.
55. Logiodice v. Trs. of Me. Cent. Inst., 296 F.3d 22, 27 (1st Cir. 2002).
56. Logiodice, 296 F.3d at 27.
57. LoTempio, supra note 12, at 455–56.
58. Id. at 456.
59. Id.
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Under the entwinement test, when private conduct is “ ‘entwined with
governmental policies’ or when the government is ‘entwined in [the con-
duct’s] management or control,’” the action becomes state action.60 In
Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association, the
Court established the entwinement test and held that an action taken by a
statewide interscholastic athletic association61 was state action because the
association was entwined with the state.62 The Court noted that “almost all
of Tennessee’s public schools were members of the association, most of the
association’s members were public school officials, the majority of the asso-
ciation’s funding came from the state, and the association governed intercol-
legiate athletics in lieu of the state’s Board of Education.”63 Aggregating
these factors, the Court held a reasonable person would conclude that the
state was involved in the action.64
B. The State Action Analysis Applied to Charter School Policies
The key factors courts consider in applying the state action test to
charter schools are (1) the status of the plaintiff (student or teacher) and,
relatedly, (2) whether the nature of the action pertains to the provision of
equal educational opportunities for all students.65 Significantly, in all the
cases applying the state action doctrine in the charter school context, where
the plaintiff was a student asserting a deprivation of the right to equal edu-
cational opportunities, the court found state action. Conversely, in the cases
where the plaintiff was a teacher asserting a deprivation of a fundamental
right, the court did not consistently find state action.
Milonas v. Williams and Scaggs v. New York illustrate how courts find
state action when student-plaintiffs assert deprivations of equal education
rights. In Milonas v. Williams, the state action doctrine was applied to a
60. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 296 (2001)
(citing Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299, 301 (1966)).
61. An interscholastic athletic association organizes and coordinates athletic competition
and programs of high schools throughout the state.
62. Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 291.
63. LoTempio, supra note 12, at 445 (citing Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 291).
64. LoTempio, supra note 12, at 445.
65. In an increasingly outdated line of cases, when initially faced with constitutional
violations in charter schools, lower courts had simply presumed that the charter
schools were state actors, foregoing the state action analysis altogether. Eventually,
federal courts began to realize the need to analyze each constitutionally challenged
action under the state action analysis. Though lower courts in recent years have
undertaken state action analyses in cases involving constitutional rights deprivations
in charter schools, the resulting line of precedent is inconsistent. LoTempio, supra
note 12, at 451–52.
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pseudo-charter school66 after the school subjected students, some involunta-
rily placed in the school by state officials, to a behavior modification pro-
gram.67 The Tenth Circuit held that the behavior modification program was
state action pursuant to the close nexus test.68 The court found that the
primary distinction between this case and Rendell-Baker lay in the status of
the plaintiffs—they were students, not teachers. The court also found sig-
nificant the involuntary nature of some of the students’ Provo Canyon
School placement, which was done by juvenile courts and other state agen-
cies, with or without parental consent.69
In Scaggs v. New York, a district court judge in the Eastern District of
New York found state action (and the violation of the Equal Protection
Clause) in a charter school’s lack of accommodations for disabled stu-
dents.70 The court held that the school defendants were state actors under a
set of factors that most closely resembles the public function test.71 Like the
Tenth Circuit in Milonas, the court held that the plaintiffs’ statuses as stu-
dents dispositively distinguished them from the teacher-plaintiffs of Rendell-
Baker.72 The court also noted that the state was quite uninvolved in the
termination of a single teacher in Rendell-Baker, whereas here, “the claims
relate to the alleged total inadequacy of a school to provide free public edu-
cation to its students while receiving state funding, being bound to state
educational standards and purporting to offer the same educational services
and facilities as any other public school.”73 The court went on to hold that
66. The school was established in 1973, before the advent of specifically-designated
“charter schools,” but it is unique from traditional private schools. Unlike other
private schools, when this case was decided in 1982, Provo Canyon School received
both state and federal funds. The school is privately owned and operated, and “many
of the youths are placed at the Provo Canyon School by the boy’s local school dis-
tricts, with tuition funding coming from state and federal agencies pursuant to state
special education laws and the federal Education for All Handicapped Children Act.”
Milonas v. Williams, 691 F.2d 931, 935-36 (10th Cir. 1982).
67. Milonas, 691 F.2d at 939–40. In Milonas, the Tenth Circuit held that an action
taken by a private school for boys with behavioral problems was state action. The
action at issue was a behavioral modification program. The court held that the pri-
mary distinction between this case and Rendell-Baker was that the plaintiffs in this
case were students, where the plaintiffs in Rendell-Baker were teachers. The court
held significant the fact that some of the students at issue were involuntarily placed
into the school by state officials, and those officials had knowledge of and approved
some of the behavior modification practices of the school. Id.
68. Milonas, 691 F.2d at 940.
69. Milonas, 691 F.2d at 940.
70. Scaggs v. N.Y. Dep’t of Educ., No. 06–CV–0799, 2007 WL 1456221, at *13
(E.D.N.Y. May 16, 2007).
71. Scaggs, 2007 WL 1456221, at *13.
72. Scaggs, 2007 WL 1456221, at *13.
73. Scaggs, 2007 WL 1456221, at *13.
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Section 1983 claims against charter schools could properly be brought when
they related to “the nature and quality of education received at charter
schools.”74
Of the cases that apply the state action test to charter schools, the
Delhi Charter School case is most similar to Scaggs v. New York, which
considered a school’s lack of accommodation for disabled students.75 Preg-
nancy should be treated as a temporary disability, as is reflected in legisla-
tion on the rights of pregnant teens in schools.76 The Delhi Charter School
policy is dissimilar from the action at issue in Rendell-Baker and more simi-
lar to the action considered in Scaggs because the action taken here affected
a student of the charter school, and the act of expelling pregnant students
critically impacts the provision of equal educational opportunities to all
students.
The ruling courts also found state action in one of the two cases in-
volving a teacher-plaintiff. In Riester v. Riverside Community School, a dis-
trict court judge in the Southern District of Ohio considered the
application of the state action doctrine to a charter school’s termination of a
teacher, as the United States Supreme Court had in Rendell-Baker.77 This
time, the court held that the school defendants were state actors because a
state statute categorically held the actions of “community schools” to be
state actions.78 However, the court also noted that the actions taken were
state actions under the public function and entwinement tests.79 The court
held that because a charter school and its administrators terminated the
plaintiff, and because the State Board of Education had to approve the crea-
tion of that charter school, the court must consider the charter school’s
actions analogous to those of the state.80 The court determined the case was
factually distinct enough from Rendell-Baker,81 noting that the charter status
74. Scaggs, 2007 WL 1456221, at *13.
75. See Scaggs, 2007 WL 1456221, at *13.
76. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.40(b)(2) (requiring that a physician’s note for excusal from
activities may only be required of a pregnant student if it is also required of other
students with physician-treated physical or emotional conditions). See also 34 C.F.R.
§ 106.40(b)(4) (“A recipient shall treat pregnancy . . . and recovery therefrom in the
same manner and under the same policies as any other temporary disability with
respect to any medical or hospital benefit, service, plan or policy which such recipi-
ent administers, operates, offers, or participates in with respect to students admitted
to the recipient’s educational program or activity.”).
77. Riester v. Riverside Cmty. Sch., 257 F. Supp. 2d 968 (S.D. Ohio 2002).
78. Riester, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 972.
79. Riester, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 972.
80. Riester, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 972–73.
81. Riester, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 972–73.
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of the school, as distinguished from the private school at issue in Rendell-
Baker, was significant.82
In the second case to address a charter school’s termination of a
teacher, the Ninth Circuit determined that the school’s conduct was not
state action.83 Of the four cases applying the state action doctrine in the
charter school context, this case, Caviness v. Horizon Community Learning
Center, Inc., is factually most similar to Rendell-Baker. The court noted that
the plaintiff’s attempt to distinguish from Rendell-Baker, on the grounds
that the Rendell-Baker school was private and this school was statutorily
characterized as public, was ineffective.84 The court also held that, though
the state in this case regulated the personnel matters of charter schools, state
regulation alone was not enough to mandate a state action designation.85
Citing Rendell-Baker, the court held that this action failed the close nexus
test since there was no coercive action taken by the state to compel the
employment decision.86
C. Analysis of Delhi Charter School’s Policy: Is this State Action?
Of the five tests, the public function test and the entwinement test are
most applicable to pregnancy expulsion policies promulgated by charter
schools such as Delhi Charter School.
First, the public function test is especially applicable in the education
context because of the historic role of the state as the primary provider of
education. Though the Court in Rendell-Baker established that the educa-
tion of maladjusted students is not within the exclusive province of the
state, this narrow holding does not apply to the policy at issue here. The
provision of education is unquestionably one of the traditional functions of
the state. Furthermore, the public function test was designed to prevent
state actors from delegating authority to evade liability. Delhi Charter
82. Riester, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 973. The Court also held that the charter school was a
state actor under the entwinement test. Id. The Court noted that no entities other
than charter schools and local school districts had been delegated the authority to
provide free and nondiscriminatory public schooling to residents of the state. Id.
Citing this lack of other schools delegated that same authority by the state, the Court
held that the entwinement test had been met and thus the termination was a state
action. Id.
83. Caviness v. Horizon Cmty. Learning Ctr., 590 F.3d 806, 808 (9th Cir. 2010).
84. Caviness, 590 F.3d at 815. In Riester, the school relied on approval from the State
Board of Education for its creation. Riester, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 972–73. Whereas
in Caviness (as was the case in Rendell-Baker), the school was a private entity brought
into existence by private individuals which subsequently contracted with the state to
provide state-funded education services. Caviness, 590 F. 3d at 815.
85. Caviness, 590 F.3d at 816.
86. Caviness, 590 F.3d at 816.
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School is a charter school and, as previously detailed, the creations of all
charter schools in Louisiana are overseen by the Louisiana Department of
Education or their local school board.87 Additionally, the school receives
98% of its budget from state and federal funding.88 Given the policy inter-
est underlying the public function test and the unique nature of charter
schools as overseen and funded by the state, the public function test is espe-
cially relevant to the analysis of charter school policies.
Second, with regard to the entwinement test, it is inherent that the
state would be involved in the policies promulgated by a charter school.
Charter schools are distinguished from private schools by virtue of state
involvement (a contract with the state and continuous state supervision).
The entwinement test asks whether a reasonable person would conclude
that the state was involved in the Delhi Charter School policy.89 The
school’s founding was overseen by the Louisiana Department of Educa-
tion,90 the Board of Education reviews the charter’s progress toward its
stated goals (primarily, of providing an education to “at risk” students),91
and 98% of the school’s funding comes from the state and the federal gov-
ernment.92 The ideologies behind the public function and entwinement
tests, particularly the former, support their use to review Delhi Charter
School’s policy, and thus the school’s expulsion policy is state action.
D. Public Policy Justifications for Finding State Action
Numerous public policy reasons weigh in favor of holding that preg-
nancy expulsion policies, like the Delhi Charter School’s policy, are state
acts. These reasons include: (1) bridging the accountability gap between the
state and the individual charter school, by assigning consequences to the
party responsible for a failure; (2) the Congressional intent behind the pas-
sage of Title IX, a federal statute prohibiting pregnancy discrimination in
schools; and (3) the state oversight needed in the new frontier of charter
schools, especially to protect students’ constitutional rights.93
87. Louisiana Charter Schools At-A-Glance, LA. DEP’T OF EDUC., https://www.loui-
sianabelieves.com/schools/charter-schools (last visited Mar. 15, 2015).
88. Delhi Charter School School District, supra note 31.
89. See LoTempio, supra note 12, at 445–46 (citing Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secon-
dary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 291 (2001)).
90. 2012 District Charter Application Process, LA. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://www.loui-
sianabelieves.com/schools/charter-schools/district-charter-school-application-process
(last visited Mar. 25, 2015).
91. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:3992(A)(1) (Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.).
92. Delhi Charter School School District, supra note 31.
93. In Part IV of this Article, I will apply Title IX to the Delhi Charter School policy
directly, but the Congressional intent expressed through Title IX also counsels for
use of the state action doctrine to protect the rights of pregnant, school-aged teens.
70 M I C H I G A N  J O U R N A L  O F  G E N D E R &  L A W [Vol. 22:55
First, the state should be held liable for its negligent charter oversight
in a case like that of Delhi Charter School because it was responsible for
holding the school accountable to its stated mission. The state charged
Delhi Charter School with maintenance of the school’s mission: to provide
an education for “at risk” students.94 Pregnant teens are considered an “at
risk” minority of students. Teen mothers are less likely to be employed and
more likely to live below the poverty line and receive public assistance than
other women.95 By expelling all pregnant teens from Delhi Charter School,
the school was preventing a categorically “at risk” body of students from
receiving an education at the school. This was in direct violation of the
school’s stated mission and thus a breach of the state’s contract with the
charter school. Given that the state was charged with overseeing the activi-
ties and actions of the school to ensure that the mission was upheld, the
possibility of liability should encourage states to more closely monitor their
contractual partners.
Second, Title IX was passed as a direct result of the Civil Rights Act of
196496 and was fueled by the women’s rights movement in the 1960s and
70s.97 The language of Title IX is almost identical to the language of Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act, which provides that no person shall be discrimi-
nated against on the basis of race, color, or national origin under any pro-
gram that receives federal assistance.98 Title IX expanded Title VI to include
sex as an impermissible basis for discrimination.99 Lead Title IX proponent
94. See Delhi Charter School Policy Manual, supra note 34, at 2–3.
95. Madeline E. McNeely, Title IX and Equal Educational Access for Pregnant and Parent-
ing Girls, 22 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 267, 269 (2007).
Teenage mothers, particularly unmarried teenage mothers, are less likely to
be employed than other women. Those who are employed work fewer
hours and earn less per hour. Teenage mothers are also more likely than
other women to live below the poverty line and to receive public assistance
such as welfare; more than 75% of unmarried teen mothers are on welfare
within five years of childbirth. High school dropouts as a whole earn about
$8,000 less per year than people who have a high school education. The
children of teen mothers are more prone to underperforming in school and
their daughters are more likely to become teenage mothers themselves.
Lower educational attainment has a noticeably negative effect on outcomes
for these girls and their children.
Id. at 269–70.
96. See Paul M. Anderson, Title IX at Forty: An Introduction and Historical Review of
Forty Legal Developments that Shaped Gender Equity Law, 22 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV.
325, 326 (2012) (discussing the origins of Title IX).
97. Title IX Legal Manual, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/cor/
coord/ixlegal.php#II (last visited Mar. 25, 2015).
98. Anderson, supra note 96, at 326.
99. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (Westlaw through P.L. 113–296).
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Senator Birch Bayh explained to Congress that the language of Title IX
intentionally reflected the language of Title VI. He noted that Title IX was
meant to prohibit sex discrimination just as discrimination based on race,
color, or national origin was prohibited because “our national policy should
prohibit sex discrimination at all levels of education.”100 Specifically, the
Senator was concerned about the link between discrimination in education
and subsequent limitation in women’s access to jobs. The Senator expressed
his concern with the resultant economic inequity on the floor of Congress:
The field of education is just one of many areas where differen-
tial treatment has been documented but because education pro-
vides access to jobs and financial security, discrimination here is
doubly destructive for women. Therefore, a strong and compre-
hensive measure is needed to provide women with solid legal
protection from the persistent, pernicious discrimination which
is serving to perpetuate second-class citizenship for American
women.101
In the Education Amendments of 1974, Congress delegated to the Depart-
ment of Health, Education, and Welfare the authority to promulgate regula-
tions implementing Title IX.102 In describing the authority of federal
agencies to implement Title IX in schools, Senator Bayh noted that Title IX
provides those agencies with the power necessary to enforce the law.103
Third, the combined goals of Title IX and the charter school system
counsel that the discriminatory actions taken by charter schools against stu-
dents should be regarded as state actions. Excluding charter schools from
state actor classification would undermine the objectives of the charter sys-
tem and Title IX, which was enacted to bridge the gender gap in income by
ensuring equal educational opportunities for men and women.
E. Refining the State Action Test in the Charter School Context
The actions taken by charter schools to limit students’ constitutional
rights should be unambiguously adopted into the fold of state action. The
Supreme Court should develop a new presumption in determining the ap-
plicability of the state action doctrine to actions taken by charter schools.
Though most of the cases dealing with the state action doctrine in charter
100. Anderson, supra note 96, at 326–27 (citing 118 CONG. REC. 5807 (1972) (state-
ment of Sen. Birch Bayh)).
101. 118 CONG. REC. 5804 (1972) (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh).
102. See H.R. Res. 69, 93d Cong. (1974) (enacted).
103. 118 CONG. REC. 5807 (1972) (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh).
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schools have touched on the Rendell-Baker holding, the standard developed
in Rendell-Baker was created with a private school in mind. Rendell-Baker
can also be distinguished from future charter school cases by the fact that it
considered a private school’s termination decision—a school action that did
not affect the constitutional rights of students. The unique characteristics of
charter schools differentiate charter schools from private schools, and the
importance of protecting students’ constitutional rights differentiate actions
affecting teachers from actions affecting students.
Lower courts consistently find state action in suits against charter
schools when student-plaintiffs allege the deprivation of equal educational
opportunities. Given that consistent recognition, the Supreme Court should
adopt those two factors as establishing a rebuttable presumption of state
action under a new test: (1) is the plaintiff a student, and (2) does the
plaintiff allege the deprivation of equal educational opportunities? Other
authors arguing for a new state action test in the charter school context have
proffered options such as a fact-based inquiry that reflects the analysis per-
formed by the Court in Brentwood,104 or a variant on the public function
test currently performed in the private prison context.105
Maren Hulden suggests the Brentwood-esque, fact-based inquiry, not-
ing that federal precedent in the charter school arena has made clear that
“charter schools are state actors for claims brought by students, but not for
all claims brought by employees.”106 No court has ever dismissed a state
action claim lodged by a student in the charter school context. Though
suggested tests like Hulden’s acknowledge the significance of the two key
factors the lower courts have drawn out in their collective jurisprudence, the
proposed tests do not explicitly account for those factors.107 Given the uni-
104. Maren Hulden argues that:
[C]ourts should consider the alleged state action under the guiding factors
in Brentwood, considering the extent to which: (1) the alleged violation re-
sulted from the state’s coercion, (2) the entity participates in a joint activity
with the state, (3) the entity is so closely tied to the state so as to be con-
trolled by it, (4) the entity is performing a delegated public function, (5)
the entity is entwined with government policies, and (6) the government is
entwined with the entity’s management or control. However, instead of
treating each factor with “rigid simplicity,”—as in Caviness—courts should
consider the facts comprehensively and find state action when significant
factors point to a “close nexus between the State and the challenged action,”
as described in Brentwood.
Maren Hulden, Charting a Course to State Action: Charter Schools and § 1983, 111
COLUM. L. REV. 1244, 1288 (2011).
105. See LoTempio, supra note 12, at 460–61.
106. Hulden, supra note 104, at 1293.
107. For example, Hulden acknowledges that her Brentwood-based test
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versally acknowledged importance of the plaintiff’s student status and the
allegation of a fundamental right deprivation, a rebuttable presumption that
state action will be found in cases that display both factors would best pro-
tect charter school students’ constitutional rights. Certainly, a subsequent
fact-based inquiry or a public function test similar to the private prison
context might rebut an initial presumption of state action. However, given
the courts’ historic inconsistency in determining state action in the charter
school context,108 relying upon those courts to systematically find state ac-
tion in the charter school context under a test that does not explicitly ac-
count for those two key factors is risky. This rebuttable presumption would
provide the most protection to charter school students deprived of their
constitutional rights while preserving charter schools’ relative autonomy in
employment decisions.
III. THE EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGE
Of course, overcoming the state action hurdle is only the beginning of
stating an Equal Protection claim against a charter school. If a court finds
state action in a school’s pregnancy expulsion policy, it must then determine
the applicability of Geduldig v. Aiello with regard to the Equal Protection
analysis of the policy. If a court decides that the policy contains no evidence
of invidious discrimination, the rational basis test must be applied to deter-
mine whether the policy is constitutionally permissible.109 On the other
hand, if a court finds that a school’s justifications for the policy are mere
pretexts concealing a true intent to discriminate against women, the policy
is unconstitutional per the Equal Protection Clause. In Section A, I discuss
the legacy of Geduldig in more detail, and in Section B, I discuss the excep-
tion for invidious discrimination. Within Section B, I discuss the historical
reasoning for pregnancy discrimination in schools and the inadequacy of
those stated justifications, and argue that Delhi Charter School’s policy
should typically lead courts to find state action by charter schools in the
context of claims brought by students and parents, such as those challeng-
ing enrollment, disciplinary actions, or access to education, but rarely in the
context of claims brought by employees. [. . .] Courts applying this analysis
should find that charter schools are state actors in the case of most claims
brought by students and parents because the delegated public function the
school performs and the degree of state regulation and entwinement will
normally render the state’s involvement close enough to the challenged ac-
tion to meet the nexus requirement.
Id. at 1278, 1288–89.
108. See id. at 1266–67 (noting the various approaches used by courts).
109. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496–97 (1974) (applying this approach).
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(and, by extension, any pregnancy expulsion policy) is invidiously
discriminatory.
A. Equal Protection Claims Based on Pregnancy Status:
The Legacy of Geduldig
In 1974, The Supreme Court in Geduldig v. Aiello held that facial
distinctions on the basis of pregnancy are gender-neutral, and thus preg-
nancy discrimination does not necessarily constitute sex discrimination in
the realm of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment.110 The
Court applied rational basis scrutiny to the denial of insurance benefits for
work loss resulting from a normal pregnancy.111 The Court stated that
“[w]hile it is true that only women can become pregnant, it does not follow
that every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based clas-
sification.”112 The Court held that, rather than a distinction based on gen-
der, laws mandating differential treatment for pregnant women target
pregnant, as opposed to non-pregnant, persons.113 Though many state legis-
latures and Congress have rejected this reasoning and enacted statutory
prohibitions on pregnancy discrimination, Geduldig’s three main holdings
must be considered when applying the constitutional equal protection anal-
ysis to pregnancy discrimination cases.114 First, Geduldig “deems pregnancy-
based government classifications to be facially neutral with respect to gen-
der.”115 Second, it allows governments to justify sex-based classifications on
the basis of pregnancy or childbearing capability.116 Third, Geduldig reaf-
firms what rational basis review presumes—that courts should apply defer-
ence when considering the government’s reasoning behind possibly
discriminatory action that arguably infringes on the constitutional rights of
pregnant women.117
Though Geduldig allows courts to defer to the stated purposes of state
and federal governments in legislation that targets pregnant women, there is
an exception to the general holding of the case. While in most cases a dis-
tinction based on a woman’s pregnant status does not support an inference
of sex-based discrimination, Geduldig’s general holding does not apply in
110. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 495–96.
111. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 484.
112. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 484.
113. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 484.
114. Kim Shayo Buchana, Lawrence v. Geduldig: Regulating Women’s Sexuality, 56 EM-
ORY L.J. 1235, 1236 (2007) (discussing the application of the principles of Lawrence
to Geduldig).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1236–37.
117. Id. at 1237.
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cases of invidious discrimination. The Court noted that “[if] distinctions
involving pregnancy are mere pretexts designed to effect an invidious dis-
crimination against the members of one sex or the other,” this would re-
move a case from the realm of pregnancy discrimination jurisprudence
governed by Geduldig and would instead allow the court to find the policy a
result of sex-based discrimination and as such unconstitutional.118
The Court reiterated this exception two years later in a case factually
very similar to Geduldig that arose under Title VII: General Electric Co. v.
Gilbert.119 In Gilbert, the Court held that an insurance plan that excluded
disabilities arising from pregnancy did not constitute sex-based discrimina-
tion within the meaning of Title VII.120 Quoting the language of Geduldig,
the Court noted that:
There is no evidence in the record that the selection of the risks
insured by the program worked to discriminate against any de-
finable group or class in terms of the aggregate risk protection
derived by that group or class from the program. There is no risk
from which men are protected and women are not. Likewise,
there is no risk from which women are protected and men are
not.121
However, the Court acknowledged Geduldig’s exception: “[W]e recog-
nized in Geduldig, of course, that the fact that there was no sex-based dis-
crimination as such was not the end of the analysis, should it be shown that
distinctions involving pregnancy are mere pretexts designed to effect an in-
vidious discrimination against the members of one sex or the other.”122 In
1978, Congress overruled the decision in Gilbert with the passage of the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act123—an amendment to Title VII, the sex dis-
crimination provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.124
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act amended Title VII by adding a
prohibition on all forms of pregnancy discrimination,125 applicable to em-
118. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496 n.20.
119. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
120. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 145–46.
121. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 135 (quoting Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496–97).
122. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 135 (quoting Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496–97) (quotation marks
omitted).
123. This policy might also be challenged on the basis of the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act, but that analysis is outside the realm of this paper.
124. Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)
(Westlaw through through P.L. 113–296)).
125. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (Westlaw through through P.L. 113–296) (“The terms ‘be-
cause of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’ include, but are not limited to, because of or on
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ployers of fifteen or more employees.126 Through the Pregnancy Discrimina-
tion Act, Congress not only overturned the holding of Gilbert (that the
exclusion of disabilities caused by pregnancy did not constitute sex-based
discrimination), but it also rejected the reasoning of Gilbert—that although
only women can become pregnant, pregnancy discrimination is not sex-
based discrimination.127
In Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. v. E.E.O.C., the Su-
preme Court abided by the provisions of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.
It held that a health insurance plan that provided less favorable insurance
benefits for pregnant spouses of employees than for employees who them-
selves were pregnant constituted pregnancy discrimination.128 The Court
again noted that a showing of invidious discrimination against the members
of one sex would bring the analysis outside of the bounds of the holding of
Geduldig with regard to facially neutral pregnancy distinctions.129
B. Invidious Discrimination in a Charter School’s
Pregnancy Expulsion Policy
Historically, and still today, school administrators have advanced
many justifications for expelling pregnant teens from public schools or, al-
ternatively, coercing them to voluntarily withdraw. The justifications have
centered around four common themes: (1) the idea of “contagious preg-
nancy”; (2) an attempt by schools to hide visible indicators of “morally
reprehensible” action, which was believed to reflect poorly on the school;
(3) health concerns; and (4) lack of school resources to provide accommoda-
tions for pregnant teens.130 However, these excuses lack rational bases, indi-
cating that the true reason for attempts to force pregnant teens from schools
is invidiously discriminatory.
the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions”); see also Newport
News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. E.E.O.C., 462 U.S. 669, 675-76 (1983)
(clarifying the meaning of the Act).
126. Facts About Pregnancy Discrimination, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N,
http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/fs-preg.html (last modified Sept. 8, 2008).
127. See Newport News, 462 U.S. at 678–81 (discussing the legislative history demonstrat-
ing a Congressional intent to overrule Gilbert).
128. See Newport News, 462 U.S. at 685.
129. Newport News, 462 U.S. at 677 n.13.
130. Kendra Fershee, Hollow Promises for Pregnant Students: How the Regulations Gov-
erning Title IX Fail to Prevent Pregnancy Discrimination in School, 43 IND. L. REV.
79, 85 (2009).
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1. Historic Reasoning Provided for the Expulsion of Pregnant Teens
First, without any evidence to support this belief, many school offi-
cials believe that the presence of a pregnant student in school will encourage
other students to become pregnant.131 The media attention given to the
alleged “pregnancy pact” in Gloucester, Massachusetts in 2008 indicates the
extent of this mistaken belief.132 Although it is equally likely that the pres-
ence of a pregnant teen in school might actually serve as an effective deter-
rent for other potential teen mothers, many school officials still cling to the
idea of contagious pregnancy.
Second, pregnant teens serve as a visible sign that teenaged students
are sexually active, which is still considered outside the realm of moral and
acceptable behavior. Expelling these students removes from the school a
symbol of teenage sexuality and promiscuity—a symbol that reflects poorly
on the school and its administrators.133
Third, mistaken beliefs about the health risks for pregnant teens posed
by the school environment provide another justification for schools to re-
move these students from the “hazardous” school environment.134 School
administrators commonly provide hallway jostling and gym class participa-
tion as examples of school activities and environments not suitably safe,
given the “delicate” states of pregnant teens.135
And fourth, relatedly, schools often cite concern for the physical and
emotional comfort of pregnant teens to justify expulsion.136 Administrators
note the emotional difficulties faced by pregnant teens in schools combined
with the potential for physical discomfort found in the school environ-
ment.137 Examples of aspects of the school environment deemed to contrib-
ute to the discomfort and exhaustion of pregnant students include desks ill-
suited for pregnant teens, physical education classes, and the “rigor” of class
schedules.138
131. Id. (citing WANDA S. PILLOW, UNFIT SUBJECTS: EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE
TEEN MOTHER 64–71 (2004) (describing several cases where pregnant teens were
expelled from school to keep the student body from being “contaminated” by a
pregnancy in their midst)).
132. Fershee, supra note 130, at 85–86 (stating in 2008, national media attention was
collected by an alleged “pregnancy pact” in Gloucester, Massachusetts, where a
group of teenagers supposedly entered into a pact to all become pregnant and raise
their children together. However, the credulity of this story was soon challenged
when students and administrators were questioned).
133. Id. at 87.
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2. The Weaknesses of Schools’ Stated Rationales
Pregnancy expulsion policies cannot be justified by the rationale of
protecting the interests and health of teen mothers. The four primary ex-
cuses articulated by schools to justify their pregnancy expulsion policies
have no support, scientifically or otherwise.
First, “contagious pregnancy,” an unsubstantiated belief regarding the
effects of pregnant teens on the psyches of their peers, does not provide a
rational justification for the expulsion of pregnant teens. In fact, a study
released by the National Bureau of Economic Research indicates that, eigh-
teen months after its premiere, the television show “16 and Pregnant” led to
a 5.7% drop in teen births.139 Melissa Kearney, a researcher who has studied
teen pregnancy interventions for over a decade, examined the effect of this
particular show on teen pregnancy rates.140 She believes that shows like “16
and Pregnant” deter teen pregnancy because they “make it clear how hard it
can be [to be a teen mom]” and “affect girls who might not care other-
wise.”141 The same logic counsels that teens who witness the realities of their
classmates’ pregnancies would be less, not more, likely to become pregnant
themselves. This research clearly indicates that the concept of “contagious
pregnancy” is meritless.
Second, schools’ interests in hiding visible indicators that their stu-
dents are engaging in “morally reprehensible” behaviors is self-interested
and in no way serves the students affected by the policy. As Kendra Fershee
discusses in her article, “Hollow Promises for Pregnant Students,” preg-
nancy expulsion policies arose in the post-WWII era when assimilation to
ensure social and economic stability was key, well before Title IX.142 During
that time, antipathy for immigrants, among other social forces, drove indi-
viduals and institutions alike to strive to meet a standard of excellence based
in sameness.143 To guarantee their own job security, school authorities
needed to ensure that the product they manufactured—the school—met
society’s standards.144 Thus, school authorities felt the same assimilationist
pressure to present a homogenous student body, marked by both academic
excellence and moral purity.145 Pregnant teenagers were a visible blight to
the reputation of institutions that attempted to meet society’s standard of




142. See Fershee, supra note 130, at 87–88.
143. See id. at 87.
144. See id.
145. See id.
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excellence.146 Students engaging in sexual behavior were well outside social
norms of the time, and by expelling the pregnant teens, school authorities
quickly solved the problem of obvious non-assimilation.147
Third, the physical vulnerabilities of pregnant teens are egregiously
overstated by schools. While schools purport that subjecting teens to certain
aspects of the school environment, such as gym class, might seriously en-
danger the mother and her child, according to the CDC the real risks inher-
ent in exercise during pregnancy are minimal and the benefits great.148
According to scientific evidence, moderate-intensity aerobic activity carries
very little risk for pregnant women.149 Physical activity does not increase the
risk factors for low birth weight, early delivery, or early miscarriage.150 In
fact, regular exercise during pregnancy ensures heart and lung health and
improves mood, among other benefits.151
Fourth, and relatedly, schools overstate the degree of accommodation
needed to meet the physical and emotional needs of pregnant teens. For
example, to prevent jostling in the hallways, schools might allow pregnant
teens to leave class five minutes before the bell sounds—an accommodation
many high schools already afford to less mobile students, such as those on
crutches.
A high school education is paramount to an individual’s potential for
success, and teen pregnancy is the number one reason girls drop out of high
school.152 Predictably, studies indicate that parenthood disproportionately
affects the educational experiences of female students. Research by the Gates
Foundation shows that 33% of female dropouts listed pregnancy as the rea-
son for their unfinished high school education, while only 19% of male
dropouts listed parenthood.153
Teen mothers have significantly less promising job prospects than
other women of similar ages, and high school dropouts in general earn
$8,000 less per year than graduates.154 Working teen mothers work fewer
hours for less pay than other women and are more likely to require public
146. See id.
147. See id. at 87–88.
148. Healthy Pregnant or Postpartum Women, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVEN-
TION, http://www.cdc.gov/physicalactivity/everyone/guidelines/pregnancy.html (last




152. McNeely, supra note 95, at 269.
153. Michelle Gough, Parenting and Pregnant Students: An Evaluation of the Implementa-
tion of the “Other” Title IX, 17 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 211, 213–14 (2011).
154. McNeely, supra note 95, at 269. These jobs are both inferior in quality and also
fewer in quantity. Id.
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assistance and live below the poverty line.155 More than 75% of unmarried
teen mothers are receiving government welfare by the time their children
reach age five.156 The children of teen mothers are less likely to succeed in
school and more likely to become teen mothers themselves than children
not raised by teen mothers.157 If schools are truly striving to help teen
moms, there is no public interest justification for pregnancy expulsion
policies.
3. The Sources of Invidious Discrimination
Given the unpersuasive quality of the expulsion justifications proffered
by schools, invidious sex-based discrimination appears to be the true impe-
tus behind the coerced or direct expulsion policies. In Loving v. Virginia,
where the Court found no other rational explanation for a state’s anti-mis-
cegenation statute, racial discrimination was presumed the true impetus.158
Loving was decided three years after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. Racism was rampant across the country,159 which contributed to the
Court’s suspicion of the facially neutral anti-miscegenation statute.160 Pres-
ently, gender discrimination remains a problem in this country and the
world. Women face inequities that are often attributable to inferior educa-
tional opportunities, as is especially apparent in countries outside of the
United States. Title IX was enacted to level the educational playing field for
women in an attempt to improve women’s job prospects and salary poten-
tial.161 As was true with regard to race when Loving was decided, courts
today should be highly suspicious of expulsion policies that unduly burden
women’s access to education and serve no legitimate purpose.
Two psychosocial phenomena illuminate the gender discrimination
apparent in pregnancy expulsion policies: (1) the historic idealization of fe-
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 269–70.
158. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1967).
159. In ways only slightly more blatant than what we see across our country today.
160. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 6.
161.
The field of education is just one of many areas where differential treatment
[between men and women] has been documented but because education
provides access to jobs and financial security, discrimination here is doubly
destructive for women. Therefore, a strong and comprehensive measure is
needed to provide women with solid legal protection from the persistent,
pernicious discrimination which is serving to perpetuate second-class citi-
zenship for American women.
118 CONG. REC. 5806–07 (1972) (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh).
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male, and especially teen, virginity; and (2) society’s obsession with teen
sexuality.
a. Idealization of female virginity
The history of idealizing female, and especially teen, virginity dates
back to the Middle Ages, and it is exemplified in the writings and practices
of the Renaissance. Through the Renaissance, individuals were bound and
defined by their fama, a Roman conception of reputational honor that, for
women, was defined by chastity and safeguarded by the men in their
lives.162 A woman’s value consisted of her marriageable qualities: chastity,
virtue, and virginity were among the most important.163 The penalty for
“presumed defloration” (raping a virgin) in some instances could be five
years slavery, to be spent rowing in a ship’s galley, or five years banishment
from the city.164 Notably, rape was defined as the forced taking of a victim’s
virginity.165 Highlighting the importance of female virginity, rape of non-
virgins was infrequently prosecuted.166 It was not the violent crime itself
that merited harsh punishment, but rather the marring of a chaste woman’s
honor through defloration. “[A]ccording to the canons of moral codes, both
Christian and honor centered, virginity was the essence of a young female’s
virtue.”167 Without her virtue, synonymous with her virginity, the law did
not recognize a woman as a person with full legal rights served by the crimi-
nal justice system.
If society’s pseudo-criminalization of teen pregnancy is the result of an
antiquated view of female (and especially teen) sexuality as a sacred posses-
sion, the (potentially subconscious) motive for policies such as the one at
162. See Thomas Kuehn, Fama as a Legal Status in Renaissance Florence, in FAMA: THE
POLITICS OF TALK & REPUTATION IN MEDIEVAL EUROPE 27, 27 (Thelma Fenster
and Daniel Lord Smail eds., 2003).
163. See MARGARET F. ROSENTHAL, THE HONEST COURTESAN: VERONICA FRANCO,
CITIZEN AND WRITER IN SIXTEENTH-CENTURY VENICE 68 (1993). The virginity of
teen girls was especially valued and protected by the particularly patriarchal society of
the Renaissance. One of the most prolific female writers of the time, Veronica
Franco, wrote to an acquaintance who worked as a courtesan and who was consider-
ing allowing her daughter to work in the sex industry, “You know how many times I
have begged and warned you to protect her virginity.” VERONICA FRANCO, POEMS
AND SELECTED LETTERS 38 (Ann Rosalind Jones & Margaret F. Rosenthal eds. &
trans., 1998).
164. ALEXANDRA LAPIERRE, ARTEMISIA 186 (2001).
165. Elizabeth S. Cohen, The Trials of Artemisia Gentileschi: A Rape as History, 31 SIX-
TEENTH CENTURY J. 47, 59 (2000) (citation omitted).
166. Elizabeth S. Cohen, No Longer Virgins: Self-Presentation by Young Women in Late
Renaissance Rome, in REFIGURING WOMAN: PERSPECTIVES ON GENDER AND THE
ITALIAN RENAISSANCE 169, 172 (Marilyn Migiel & Juliana Schiesari eds., 1991).
167. Id.
82 M I C H I G A N  J O U R N A L  O F  G E N D E R &  L A W [Vol. 22:55
Delhi Charter School is based on gender discrimination and not altruism, as
purported by the schools. The gendered nature of society’s condemnation of
teen sex is reflected by punishment rates. As indicated in a number of cases
involving the denial of pregnant teens’ admissions to the National Honor
Society, the teen boys fathering these children are not punished for their
engagement in premarital sex.168 Only the girls are expelled, coerced into
dropping out, or excluded from school organizations. The disproportionate
and gendered effect of society’s attempts to discourage premarital sex is an
indication that the intent of such attempts and related school policies is
only to circumscribe the sexual behaviors of women.
b. Society’s obsession with the sex lives of teens
Society’s obsession with the sex lives of teens is simultaneously un-
abashed and covert. The popularity of television shows such as Teen Mom,169
16 and Pregnant,170 and Skins171 highlight this voyeuristic interest. The para-
dox of society’s obvious interest and yet feigned disinterest is captured in the
psychoanalytic concept of reaction formation. The concept holds that any
extreme, emotional trend in one direction (like hate or love) is an indicator
that the individual may actually be defending against awareness of the op-
posite emotion.172 Fascination with teen sex is not acceptable to the individ-
ual’s conscious mind and thus the individual reacts against that forbidden
fascination with an exaggerated denouncement of teen pregnancy. In her
book, Romantic Outlaws, Beloved Prisons: The Unconscious Meanings of
Crime and Punishment, Martha Grace Duncan writes that the exaggerated,
and often illogical, punishment of criminals in our society indicates that we
as a society are obsessed with and actually attracted to criminality.173
Invidious discrimination is at work in pregnancy expulsion policies—
all other possible rationales are decidedly unpersuasive. Rather than altruis-
tic concern for the well-being of pregnant students in the school environ-
ment, these policies reflect well-documented psychosocial phenomena. The
168. See, e.g., Wort v. Vierling, 778 F.2d 1233 (7th Cir. 1985); Cazares v. Barber, 959
F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1992); Pfeiffer v. Marion Ctr. Area Sch. Dist., 917 F.2d 779 (3rd
Cir. 1990); Chapman v. Grant Cnty. Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 975 (E.D. Ky.
1998). Each of these cases dealt with gender discrimination claims by pregnant teens
who were denied membership in their respective school’s chapter of the National
Honor Society.
169. A reality show airing on MTV that follows the lives of teenage mothers.
170. A reality show airing on MTV that follows the pregnancies of teenage girls.
171. A British teen drama that follows the lives of teenagers. Storylines include an empha-
sis on adolescent sexuality.
172. MARTHA GRACE DUNCAN, ROMANTIC OUTLAWS, BELOVED PRISONS: THE UN-
CONSCIOUS MEANINGS OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 105 (1996).
173. Id. at 107–08.
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exception left available under Geduldig provides opportunity for redress
when such invidious discrimination is apparent, and it should be utilized to
the benefit of pregnant teens denied of their fundamental rights.
IV. TITLE IX IMPLICATIONS OF PREGNANCY EXPULSION POLICIES
Delhi Charter School’s pregnancy policy violates the Equal Protection
Clause, but remedy through a constitutional challenge is not these plaintiffs’
only option—this policy could also be challenged under Title IX.
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 provides that, in
schools that receive federal funds, no student shall be discriminated against
on the basis of sex.174 In 1975, the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare enacted regulations detailing how Title IX would be enforced.175
Specifically, a public school that receives federal funds may not discriminate
against any student on the basis of the student’s “pregnancy, childbirth,
false pregnancy, termination of pregnancy or recovery therefrom, unless the
student requests voluntarily to participate in a separate portion of the pro-
gram or activity of the recipient.”176 Because of the sparseness of relevant
case law, any analysis of a Title IX pregnancy discrimination claim in a
federally funded school must focus on the language of the statute and the
regulations implementing the statute.
The language of Title IX explicitly prohibits any discrimination based
on a student’s pregnancy status. Title IX states that this prohibition applies
to any school that receives “federal financial assistance.” But one might in-
terpret that language to be limited to public schools, as charter schools did
not exist when Title IX was written. Because of the gap between the instate-
ment of Title IX in 1972 and the creation of the first charter school in
1991, it is helpful to look to the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare’s regulatory guidelines implementing Title IX, which directly ad-
dress charter schools.177
In Section 106.34, the Regulations address the requirement that any
school that receives federal funds and excludes students on the basis of gen-
der must provide those excluded students a “substantially equal” school to
attend.178 The Regulation goes on to make an exception for nonvocational
public charter schools.179 In Section 106.40, pregnancy discrimination is
174. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (Westlaw through P.L. 113–296).
175. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.40.
176. 34 C.F.R. § 106.40(b)(1).
177. 34 C.F.R. § 106.34.
178. 34 C.F.R. § 106.34(c)(1).
179. 34 C.F.R. § 106.34(c)(2).
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directly referenced: it is prohibited in schools that receive federal funding.180
However, in this Section, there is no exception for charter schools.181 Be-
cause the sections are otherwise similarly structured, and because the Sec-
tion that provides an exception for charter schools with regard to one form
of gender discrimination appears in the Regulation before the Section with-
out the exception, the exclusion of the exception in Section 106.40 presum-
ably was intentional.
Though case law is sparse, courts have ruled on the applicability of
Title IX to pregnancy discrimination in schools in thirteen cases with mixed
results.182 Regardless of the inconsistent nature of these rulings, awareness
that students can bring these cases would encourage educators, administra-
tors, students, and the public at large to respect the educational rights of
pregnant teens. As stated by Michelle Gough in her article on the imple-
mentation of Title IX with regard to parenting and pregnant students,
“[f]iling or threatening to file a case in which a district can reasonably ex-
pect to be found to have violated a rights law, or the filing of a case, has the
potential to shift behavior without lengthy and costly litigation.”183 Unfor-
tunately, the public has only a limited awareness of the federal remedies
available to pregnant teens experiencing educational discrimination.
Congress recorded in the Pregnant and Parenting Students Access to
Education Act of 2011 that many pregnant students have their rights vio-
lated.184 In its findings of fact, Congress noted that in the United States,
there are roughly 750,000 teen pregnancies and 400,000 teen births annu-
ally, though these numbers include women up to age nineteen (and so do
not accurately reflect the number of teen pregnancies in middle or high
schools).185 Three in ten U.S. adolescents will become pregnant before age
twenty, the highest rate of all Western industrialized countries.186 Congress
also found that “pregnant and parenting students face significant barriers in
enrolling, attending, and succeeding in school, including . . . discrimination
in violation of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, including
stigmatization at school by administrators, teachers, and peer students.”187
Despite the prevalence of Title IX violations, few students bring Title IX
cases to address pregnancy discrimination. There are now nineteen relevant
180. 34 C.F.R. § 106.40.
181. 34 C.F.R. § 106.40.
182. Gough, supra note 153, at 220.
183. Id. at 253. “For example, the New York ‘P Schools’ were closed by the threat of
litigation.” Id.
184. Pregnant and Parenting Students Access to Education Act, H.R. 2617, 112th Cong.
§ 2(a) (2011).
185. H.R. 2617, 112th Cong. § 2(a)(2)– (3).
186. H.R. 2617, 112th Cong. § 2(a)(2)– (3).
187. H.R. 2617, 112th Cong. § 2(a)(5)(A).
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cases, though only thirteen alleged Title IX violations.188 Additionally, the
legal community perceives an absence of Title IX case law that is greatly
exaggerated.189 This leads to even less effective implementation, as parties
affected by rulings on discriminatory behaviors (and their lawyers) are less
likely to seek guidance from the case law if they believe it to be nonexistent.
A. The Application of Title IX to the Delhi Charter School Policy
Delhi Charter School receives approximately $400,000 in federal
funds per year190 and should thus be subject to Title IX.191 The Delhi Char-
ter School policy mandated homeschooling for any student suspected of
being pregnant who tested positive for pregnancy or refused to submit to
the pregnancy test. This policy stands in direct contradiction to the lan-
guage of Title IX, which bans discrimination based on pregnancy,192 includ-
ing forced expulsion. Unless the student, without coercion, independently
decides to attend an alternative school, drop out, or begin home-schooling
as the result of pregnancy, Title IX strictly forbids any actions a school
might take to encourage those choices.193 Though the application of Title
IX to charter schools could be debated due to the nonexistence of charter
schools when Title IX was written, the regulations implementing Title IX
indicate that charter schools are subject to it.
188. See Gough, supra note 153, at 220; Dawson v. Pine Bluff Sch. Dist., No.
5:10CV00213, 2011 WL 5508885 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 10, 2011) (bringing the total
number of cases to nineteen).
189. See Gough, supra note 153, at 218–19.
In her 1994 article Brake said, “[b]ecause very little case law exists interpret-
ing the rights of pregnant students under Title IX, courts evaluating these
claims should be guided primarily by the language of the Title IX regula-
tion.” Ten years later, Pillow says that “[t]here has been no case law under
Title IX to determine what educational opportunities for school-age
mothers looks like and why schools continue to be ambivalent.” McNeely’s
2007 law review article states, “[T]here is an almost total absence of litiga-
tion in this area, except for several cases in which students have been ex-
cluded or dismissed from the National Honor Society.” [. . .] Numerous
other law reviews and articles continue to describe and reinforce the per-
ceived lack of case law addressing school-aged current and expectant
mothers, either generally or under specific topics.
190. Delhi Charter School School District, supra note 31.
191. “No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from partici-
pation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 20 U.S.C.
§ 1681(a) (Westlaw through P.L. 113–296).
192. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.40(b)(1).
193. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.40(b)(1).
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B. Tightening up Title IX
Though the Delhi Charter School policy presents a clear-cut example
of pregnancy discrimination in violation of Title IX, much more subversive
means of discrimination threaten students around the country. Under the
Title IX regulations promulgated by the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare, schools may not expel nor encourage the voluntary dropout of
pregnant teens.194 Though statistics tell us that the number one reason for
high school dropouts is teen pregnancy,195 we have no statistics indicating
whether coercion or mistreatment from teachers or administrators led to
those dropouts. Also, we have no systematically collected statistics reporting
the dropout rates among pregnant teens, which would be helpful in assess-
ing the level and quality of support provided by schools to pregnant
teens.196
Addressing both blatant and more subversive pregnancy discrimina-
tion alike, in 2012 the National Women’s Law Center (“NWLC”) pub-
lished “A Pregnancy Test for Schools: The Impact of Education Laws on
Pregnant and Parenting Students.”197 This comprehensive report evaluates
the current state of the law vis-a` -vis pregnant and parenting students, and,
inter alia, recommends Title IX reforms. As indicated in the NWLC’s re-
port, the Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights (“OCR”) has
failed the pregnant teens it is tasked with protecting. OCR oversees school
compliance with Title IX, which includes “reminding school districts of
their civil rights obligations, assisting them with compliance, conducting
investigations, and resolving complaints of discrimination.”198 From 1997
194. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.40.
195. McNeely, supra note 95, at 269.
196. Fershee, supra note 130, at 102.
197.
A Pregnancy Test for Schools outlines the ways that federal, state, and local
laws, policies, and programs can change the landscape for pregnant and
parenting students and ranks how well the state laws and policies address
the needs of these students. The report describes the particular challenges
faced by pregnant and parenting students, highlights the requirements of
federal laws, reviews relevant state laws and policies (some promising and
others sorely lacking), and concludes with recommendations for both
policymakers and for schools. The report also serves as a guide to advocates
and service providers who work with these youth; it includes a toolkit de-
signed to help them push for legal reform, implementation, and enforce-
ment in their own communities.
A Pregnancy Test for Schools: The Impact of Education Laws on Pregnant and Parenting
Students, NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR. 2 (2012), http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/
files/final_nwlc_pregnantparenting_report.pdf.
198. Id. at 9.
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to 2012, only nine complaints were filed with OCR relating to pregnancy
discrimination at the secondary education level.199 This dearth of filings
suggests that potential complainants are not aware of their rights or have
not been given the tools to act on those rights. As of 2012, OCR had also
not proactively undertaken any Title IX compliance assessments absent in-
dividual complaint filings.200
To remedy obvious failings by OCR, the NWLC report suggests a
number of Title IX reforms, any and all of which would significantly im-
prove the prognosis of pregnant teens in secondary schools. These recom-
mendations are directed toward both the federal and state governments: (1)
OCR should remind schools of their obligations under Title IX, instruct
them to review their procedural compliance with Title IX, and require them
to train their staff under Title IX; (2) OCR should conduct regular, proac-
tive compliance reviews of the schools that receive federal funds; (3) states
should write laws that uniformly include pregnancy and parenting-related
absences under the definition of “excused” absence; (4) states should require
all schools to anonymously track and record data on their pregnant and
parenting students;201 (5) states should require schools to provide state-
funded programs to pregnant and parenting students, such as individualized
graduation plans; and (6) states should require each school to designate a
Title IX coordinator tasked with monitoring compliance with Title IX, as
Title IX requires at the school district level.202 As indicated by a number of
these suggested reforms, it would not be cost-prohibitive for schools to
achieve a higher level of Title IX compliance; for instance, it would be rela-
tively cheap for OCR to remind schools of their pre-existing Title IX obliga-
tions. But regardless of the specifics, the future well-being of this
underserved and vulnerable population demands effective Title IX reform.
V. CONCLUSION
“She knew that they were waiting like wolves just outside the cir-
cumscribing light, but she had long spells of power to keep them in
hungry subjection there.”
—Thomas Hardy, Tess of the d’Urbervilles203
Pregnant teens are in danger and the law must step in to empower the
powerless. It must keep in hungry subjection the societal forces that endan-
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Such as, for example, dropout rates and reasons for dropouts.
202. A Pregnancy Test for Schools, supra note 197, at 20–21.
203. HARDY, supra note 1.
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ger the futures of women like Tess and the students of Delhi Charter
School. The rights of pregnant teens in charter schools are regularly violated
due to a combination of: (1) the inconsistency of the state action doctrine in
the charter school arena; (2) the lack of regard for the Equal Protection right
of pregnant teens to be free from sex-based discrimination; (3) ineffective
implementation of Title IX; and (4) a lack of knowledge on the parts of
administrators, teachers, and students about the constitutional and federal
statutory rights of pregnant teens in federally-funded schools. Though the
Delhi Charter School policy was a clear violation of teen students’ rights to
be free from pregnancy discrimination, not all schools are as explicit in their
discriminatory practices. Title IX prohibits coercive tactics by teachers and
administrators, but neither the statute nor the regulations implementing the
statute provide an effective means of ferreting out and penalizing this
subversion.
Specifically, three jurisprudential reforms are necessary to provide full
redress to future plaintiffs alleging pregnancy discrimination in the charter
school context. First, we must create a presumption in favor of the plaintiff
when a student alleges a civil rights deprivation by a charter school. Second,
we must recognize that pregnancy expulsion policies lack a rational basis
and reflect deeply rooted psychosocial sources of invidious discrimination.
Third, we must flesh out the regulations implementing Title IX with much
more specific guidelines, limitations, and requirements in the school con-
text. Until we take these actions, the constitutional rights of charter school
students will remain in jeopardy. Moreover, as long as pregnant teens are
denied the same educational services as all other students, the cycle of con-
demning and penalizing pregnant teens will continue. Hardy’s tale must be
laid to rest, and only through educational equality for pregnant teens will
the fates of girls like Tess be confined to the pages of history—at least in
this context.
